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Abstract 
Thaler (1980) employs prospect theory to explain the endowment effect, i.e. the empirically 
observed disparity between the willingness to pay for a certain good (WTP) and the willing-
ness to accept retribution payments in exchange for giving up this good (WTA). This disparity 
is caused either by the disutility from parting with one’s endowment and/or by an extra utility 
from ownership which is not anticipated by individuals who are not endowed with the good. 
These effects may not apply to public goods because consumers are not given exclusive 
property rights. The graphical tools introduced by Samuelson (1954) are applied to show how 
these effects influence the allocation of resources among private and public goods. An ineffi-
cient allocation only occurs if the ownership utility effect applies to one good but not to the 
other.  
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1. Introduction 
Since the 1940s, the contingent valuation method and surveys are widely applied tools to 
elicit consumers’ preferences (e.g. Hanley and Spash, 1993). The answers to these studies 
show a systematic disparity between the participants’ willingness to pay for a certain good 
(WTP) and their willingness to accept retribution payments in exchange for giving up this 
good (WTA) (e.g., Adamovicz et al.,1993; Morrison, 1997, Horowitz and McConnell, 2002). 
The literature contains different explanations for this WTA-WTP-disparity (e.g., Morrison, 
1998; Brown, 2005). The endowment effect is the most controversially discussed explana-
tions among them. It was introduced by Thaler (1980) who draws on prospect theory and 
argues that a substantial part of the disparity is caused by a general loss aversion: Individu-
als asked for their WTA for a certain good consider this good part of their endowment while 
individuals asked for their WTP do not. Given the asymmetric value function (e.g. Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1979), this difference in point of reference causes the WTA to be substantially 
larger than the WTP (Thaler, 1980). A number of experiments support the empirical validity 
of this argumentation (e.g. Kahneman et al., 1991; Franciosi, 1996, Van Boven et al., 2003). 
Among others, Knetsch (1989) and Borges and Knetsch (1998) and recently Carmichael and 
Macleod (2006) have discussed the implications of endowment effect theory for the efficiency 
of factor allocation.  
This paper adds to this literature by discussing the implications of endowment effect theory 
for the factor allocation when individuals can choose between private and public goods. It 
starts by introducing two different interpretations of Thaler’s endowment effect theory in sec-
tion 2. Accordingly, the loss aversion can be caused by a disutility from parting with one’s 
endowment and/or by an extra utility from ownership which is not anticipated by individuals 
who are not endowed with the good. Given that consumers are not given exclusive property 
rights for public goods, section 3 argues that the parting disutility as well as the ownership 
utility is likely to be much smaller for public goods than they are for private goods. Section 4 
employs the graphical tools introduced by Samuelson (1954) to show that ownership utility 
effect leads to a bias in the allocation if it applies asymmetrically to the two types of goods. If 
it applies symmetrically, the two effects neutralize each other.  
2. Endowment effect theory – two alternative interpretations 
In order to gain a better understanding of the endowment effect, this paper follows Plott and 
Zeiler (2005) in differentiating between the empirically observed phenomenon of a WTA-
WTP-disparity (i.e. the endowment effect) and the theoretical explanation based on applying 
prospect theory (hereafter endowment effect theory). There is a broad consensus among 
behavioural economists that endowment effect theory offers an important contribution to un-
derstanding the empirically observed disparity (e.g., Morrison, 1997). At the same time, there 
are two distinctly different interpretations of endowment effect theory.  
According to Loewenstein and Adler (1995) and Van Boven et al. (2003), it results from the 
fact that people get attached to goods they own. In order to provide a valid explanation for 
the WTA-WTP-disparity, the utility from feeling attached to one’s endowment has to be unan-
ticipated by those individuals who are not endowed (e.g. Van Boven et al., 2003). To illus-
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trate this, let us assume that the factors named in section 2.1 do not apply. At the same time, 
let us assume that people feel attached to the goods they possess. This feeling of attach-
ment causes an extra utility which will hereafter be called ownership utility. It is important to 
note that the ownership utility is not drawn from owning any good in particular but rather from 
owning something at all (e.g., Loewenstein and Adler, 1995). Now consider a person who 
owns a certain good A and has the possibility to trade it for another good B. If this person 
anticipated the ownership utility, his valuation of good A and B would not be influenced by 
the fact that he owns A instead of B. He would know that when trading A for B the ownership 
utility he draws from B would compensate for the ownership utility lost by giving up A. Thus, 
he would not have to demand a retribution payment for the loss in ownership utility and his 
WTP and WTA for A would – ceteris paribus – be identical. Alternatively, when not endowed 
with either A or B, the person would anticipate that he will experience an additional owner-
ship utility. Again, his WTP for A before receiving it would equal his WTA afterwards. If, on 
the other hand, the ownership utility is not anticipated, the individual does not foresee that 
possessing B will compensate him for the loss in ownership utility he suffers by giving up A. 
Nor can he anticipate the ownership utility from owning a good before possessing it. Thus, 
his WTA for a certain good will exceed its WTP even if the explanations discussed in section 
2.1 do not apply. In other words: The feeling of attachment can explain the difference be-
tween WTA and WTP only if the ownership utility is not anticipated. It describes a bias in the 
way individuals predict their own preferences (e.g., Loewenstein and Adler, 1995; Van Boven 
et al., 2000). This phenomenon will hereafter be called (unanticipated) ownership utility ef-
fect.  
Kahneman et al. (1991) offer an alternative interpretation of endowment effect theory. Ac-
cordingly, the WTA-WTP-disparity is caused by a disutility which the owner suffers when 
parting with an endowment. This disutility cannot be compensated for by owning another 
good in exchange because it results from the mere act of parting. This parting disutility effect 
can explain the WTA-WTP-disparity without implying any bias in the prediction of tastes.  
Loewenstein and Adler (1995) report on an experiment which reveals a significant prediction 
bias for the WTA. They use a mug with the logo of the students’ home university as the ob-
ject of choice. In the control group, each student is asked to guess the result of tossing a fair 
coin. Those who guess correctly are given the mug for free, the others are given the possibil-
ity to buy it later on in the experiment. After the coin is tossed and the mugs are handed out, 
those students who received a mug (control group 1) are asked for their WTA. All other stu-
dents (control group 2) are asked to state their WTP for the mug. In the experimental group, 
all students are told that each student had a 50 percent chance of receiving a mug for free. 
All he has to do is to predict the result of tossing a fair coin correctly. Before the coin is 
tossed, each student is asked to imagine that he made the right prediction and then state his 
WTA for which he would be willing to sell the mug again (anticipated WTA). The students in 
all groups are told that the actual trading price P for which they have to buy respectively sell 
the mug has been fixed ex ante but will not be announced until the end of the experiment. 
Every student who states a WTA   P has to sell the mug for the price of P. Similarly, any 
student stating a WTP  P has to buy it for the price of P.  
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Table 1: WTP, WTA and ex ante WTA for mugs 
Group Indicator N Average amount (standard error) 
control group 1 WTA 24 5,96 $ (0,460) 
control group 2 WTP 29 4,05 $ (0,329) 
experimental group anticipated WTA 53 4,16 $ (0,293) 
Source: Lowenstein and Adler (1995). 
The results of the experiment are summarized in table 1. As predicted above, the WTA in 
control group 1 turned out to be significantly higher than the WTP in control group 2. The 
anticipated WTA voiced in the experimental group was significantly lower than the WTA in 
control group 1 but showed no significant difference to the WTP in control group 2. This re-
sult suggests that the players in the experimental group did not consider the mugs their own 
before the toss of the coin and were thus not attached to it. Apparently, they did not antici-
pate the feeling of attachment (i.e. the ownership utility) but stated a hypothetical WTA which 
largely equals the WTP voiced by control group 2. This result suggests that WTA-WTP-
disparity results from a systematic bias in the prediction of tastes. The prediction bias ac-
counts for 94 per cent of the difference between WTP and WTA. With respect to the two dif-
ferent interpretations of endowment effect theory, this result suggests that the WTA-WTP-
disparity is due to an unanticipated ownership utility effect rather than to a parting disutility 
effect as suggested by Kahneman et al. (1991). The evidence provided by Van Boven et al. 
(2003) further supports this notion. Though exercise reduces the magnitude of the prediction 
bias, the participants fail to anticipate the disparity between WTA and WTP throughout the 
experiment.  
3. The WTA-WTP-disparity for publicly provided goods 
In the contingent valuation studies reported in the literature, the ratio of WTA:WTP is sub-
stantially larger for public goods than for private goods (e.g., Zöllner, 1997; Horowitz and 
McConnell, 2002). This result seems to support the notion that endowment effect theory ap-
plies to public goods just like it applies to private goods (e.g., Frey and Eichenberger, 1991; 
Hildebrandt, 1995: 119 ff.). On the other hand, the specific characteristics of public goods 
nourish doubt as to whether the empirical evidence for private goods can be generalized. For 
private goods, each individual is given an exclusive property right by which it can exclude 
other individuals from participating in consumption. Given these exclusive property rights, the 
owner can naturally regard private goods as part of his individual endowment. For public 
goods, consumers are not assigned exclusive property rights but merely have the right to use 
them parallel to others. This non-excludability from consumption may prevent the consumer 
from regarding public goods as part of his individual endowment. In this case, the disutility 
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from the act of parting can be expected to be smaller. Similarly, if excludability is a precondi-
tion for the feeling of attachment, the ownership utility derived from public goods may be 
smaller than for private goods. As a result, both parting disutility effect and ownership utility 
effect are likely to be smaller in size for public goods. In the end, they may not exist at all.  
4. Endowment effect theory and the Samuelson solution  
This section discusses the implications for allocation of resources to the provision of public 
and private goods. It employs the graphical concept suggested by Samuelson (1954, 1955) 
to illustrate the major points. Ownership utility effect and parting disutility effect are discussed 
separately.  
The basic impact of the ownership utility effect is illustrated in the standard diagram on the 
“Samuelson condition” for public goods (see figure 1). Consider an economy with two identi-
cal individuals A and B who have to decide about which amount of a public good X and a 
private good Y they want to produce and consume. The transformation curve is given by TT’. 
For illustrative reasons, the following analysis abstracts from possible problems of aggregat-
ing preferences for public goods. Instead, the individuals are assumed to follow the norma-
tive procedure suggested by Samuelson (1954, 1955). If neither the public nor the private 
good is subject to an ownership utility effect (hereafter benchmark case), A and B can cor-
rectly anticipate the experienced utility for different combinations of X and Y. In figure 1, the 
relevant indifference curves are marked in solid lines. If, furthermore, A and B are entitled to 
the same amount of the private good X, they will choose point P0. Each one of them will con-
sume x0 of the public good and y0/2 of the private good. This solution is pareto-efficient.  
Second, consider a situation in which both private and public good are subject to an endow-
ment effect. In addition, let us assume that the ratio of endowment utility to the utility experi-
enced when consuming the goods ex post is the same for X and Y (case 1). In this case, the 
marginal rate of substitution calculated by the ex ante utility (excluding the ownership utility) 
is identical to the one calculated by the utility experienced ex post. Thus, they will use the 
same indifference map as in the benchmark case. Again, they will settle for the pareto-
efficient bundle (x0,y0). The only difference to the situation in the benchmark case is that ex 
ante A and B will underestimate the experienced utility from (x0,y0).  
Third, consider a situation where the ownership utility effect is stronger for private goods than 
it is for public goods. In this case, the decision utility will lead A and B to operate with a bi-
ased marginal rate of substitution. Namely, they underestimate the loss in utility from giving 
up a marginal unit of the private good Y. This bias leads them to the map of dotted indiffer-
ence curves which are less steep than the solid indifference curves underlying the decision in 
the preceding cases. Their biased perception of utility leads A and B to settle for P* and 
(x*,y*). This bundle is not pareto-efficient; it contains too much of the public good. Both A and 
B can experience a higher level of utility if they are provided with (x0,y0) instead. However, 
once endowed with (x*,y*), the ownership utility effect (and the parting disutility effect) will 
lead the indifference curves to be kinked in P* (e.g., Knetsch, 1989; Carmichael and 
Macleod, 2006) and prevent A and B from discovering the superiority of (x0,y0). In the theo-
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retical case that the ownership utility effect for public goods is larger than the one for private 
goods, an underprovision of public goods would be expected.  
Unlike the ownership utility effect, the parting disutility effect does not imply that individuals 
have a biased perception of their own utility. Thus, individuals A and B will always choose the 
pareto-efficient bundle (x0, y0) regardless of whether private goods and/or public goods differ 
in the magnitude of the parting disutility or not.
1
  





















Endowment effect theory is one of the most widely discussed applications of prospect theory. 
Extending on Thaler’s original idea, the literature provides two alternative explanations for 
the empirically observed disparity between WTA and WTP. It  may result from the disutility 
associated with the act of parting with one’s endowment (parting disutility effect) and/or from 
the positive utility derived from ownership which is not anticipated by non-owners (ownership 
utility effect). Given these effects, it is not self-evident – as implied by different authors (e.g., 
                                                 
1
  In a dynamic perspective with shifting transformation curves and marginal rates of transformation, both ownership utility 
effect and parting disutility effect can lead to a suboptimal re-allocation of resources in the short run when pareto-
efficient reallocation would imply a reduction in the quantity of X or Y (e.g. Knetsch, 1989; Carmichael and Macleod, 
2006). In the long run, however, this does not cause a systematic bias in the allocation of resources as long as technical 
progress is not restricted to one of the two types of goods such that – on efficiency grounds – the same good should be 
reduced continuously.  
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Frey and Eichenberger, 1991; Hildebrandt, 1995: 119 ff.) – that endowment effect theory 
applies to public goods in the same way it applies to private goods. Doubt is especially nour-
ished by the fact that consumers are not assigned exclusive property rights. Consequently, 
the utility from “owning” publicly provided goods respectively the disutility from parting with 
them can be expected to be much smaller than for private goods for which consumers have 
exclusive property rights. This paper discusses the implications of endowment effect theory 
for the efficiency of public goods provision. The analysis shows that the Samuelson condition 
is satisfied if the ownership utility effect has the same strength for both private and public 
goods. If the ownership utility effect is stronger for private goods than for public goods, the 
Samuelson solution is violated; the quantity of public goods is too large. The opposite is true 
in the case when the effect is stronger for public goods. This result seems somewhat ironic: 
People who feel more attached to private goods than to public goods will get tricked into 
consuming too many public goods while people who develop a stronger attachment to public 
goods are tricked into consuming too many private goods. An efficient allocation can be ex-
pected if the ownership utility effect applies symmetrically to both types of goods and thus 
the two effects neutralize each other.  
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